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PATENT POLITICS: LIFE FORMS, MARKETS, AND THE PUBLIC
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At first blush, Shobita Parthasarathy’s PATENT POLITICS appears to be an
historical and geographic journey documenting the expanding scope of patentable
subject matter to cover a growing number of life-forms and biotechnological
discoveries. Parthasarathy comprehensively details the history of expanding
subject matter eligibility and its effect on access to medicines, traditional farming
practices, and long-standing academic research norms. Parthasarathy highlights
how representatives from each of these groups as well as civil liberties
organizations have struggled to voice their grievances before an audience of
legislators, patent offices, and courts, and how the U.S. and Europe have taken
divergent paths towards addressing such public interest concerns. In that sense,
one may view Parthasarathy’s intervention as a comparative case study in public
interest mechanisms between the U.S. and European patent systems, along with
their relative successes and failures.
However, PATENT POLITICS touches on something far more fundamental. The
book provides a sophisticated case study in the boundary work exercised by key
patent stakeholders, resulting in a Kafka-esque expertise barrier separating the
patent system from the public it is meant to serve. Many of us have encountered
the work of boundary agents in one context or another, along with attempts to
reinforce domains of expertise, distinguish their craft and knowledge from that of
others and reserve protected spaces for themselves. Yet few have previously
engaged in the level of rigorous analysis surrounding the extent and depth of
boundary work in the patent system as Parthasarathy has in PATENT POLITICS.
Partharsarathy begins her analysis by tracing historical concerns surrounding the
expanding scope of patentable subject matter in the U.S. Some of the earliest
debates regarding patenting and pharmaceutical products, such as the Oldfield
Hearings of the early 20th century, raised relatively modest suggestions that
patents could, in some circumstances, stifle innovation and hurt the availability of
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health products (p. 31). The response from industry was swift and vigorous,
summarily dismissing any such concerns as being extraneous to the workings of
the patent system. Parthasarathy points out that the vast majority of the witnesses
to testify before Congress during the Oldfield Hearings were patent lawyers,
thereby “establish[ing] industrialists and their legal representatives as the
appropriate experts because they brought direct experience with the patent
system” (p. 31). As such, from the days of these early debates, an ‘expertise’ wall
began to form dividing the patent system between an inside and an outside.
This trend not only continued over the course of the 20th century, but also
increased in intensity. In one hearing after another, public interest groups were
continuously disregarded. According to Parthasarathy, patent insiders, such as
patent attorneys and patent bureaucrats, have long employed rhetorical resources
to shut out any such public interest concerns. These rhetorical mechanisms are
the antithesis of debate, as patent insiders refuse to even acknowledge interest
group perspectives, perspectives which the insiders proclaim do not belong within
the patent system.
Even economists, law professors and senior scientists could all be dismissed and
disregarded with little effort as outsiders without any real direct experience of the
patent system (pp. 36-37, 133, 71, 31). If these individuals, with their extensive
credentials and many years of research experience could easily be disregarded,
then civil society groups attempting to introduce moral and ethical considerations
into the patent system would not stand a chance (pp. 113-114). To the patent
insiders, only those with experience in the art of patent practice can truly
understand the realities of this system (pp. 36-37). Only those who have been
directly involved in the drafting, prosecution, or litigation of patents are qualified
to participate in the patent discourse, and all other issues, including the ethics of
patenting in the life sciences, are entirely extraneous to this discourse. As
Parthasarathy points out, rather than receiving and adapting to public feedback,
over the course of these 20th century public interest conflicts, “the definition of
the patent evolved, in other words, to gain the acceptance of system
stakeholders,” those stakeholders being the large corporate patent filers, patent
bureaucrats, and patent lawyers (pp. 27-28).
Apart from the legislative context, the USPTO and the courts provided little
additional recourse for public interest concerns, given that rules regarding public
interest standing “[asserted] certain legal boundaries that restricted who could
participate in the patent system” (p. 90). Jeremy Rifkin’s battle against Diamond
v. Chakarbarty’s “anything under the sun that is made by man” crashed and
burned. Public interest groups were denied standing to challenge the patentability
of the Oncomouse (p. 90). While the “chimera” test cases did “stimulate new
organizational forms within the PTO” such as the Sensitive Application Warning
System (SAWS) program designed to flag patent applications that might generate
public interest concerns (p. 95), such programs “never really had a chance
because both the patent-system institutions and their organized interests held so
tightly to the idea that patents, and therefore patent governance, was techno-legal
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and therefore amoral” (p. 97). Even with respect to recent successes such as
Myriad, public interest groups “had to thread the eye of a narrow legal needle that
could address their immediate concerns only indirectly” (p. 171).
Some may ask how this differs from any other political domain. Is it not the case
that in many socioeconomic areas, interest groups dominate political discourse,
capture legislators and regulators, and twist their political will away from that of
the greater public good towards special interests? How is the patent system more
of an exercise of “boundary work” than any other discourse? In the typical
collision of political interests, the voices of public interest are often drowned out
by powerful and well-resourced special interests. However, as Parthasarathy
demonstrates, in the case of the patent system’s expertise barrier, public interest
voices are disqualified from participation altogether, thus making the patent
system’s disconnect from the public quite drastic compared to other issues (pp.
36-37).
The effects of boundary work and the expertise barrier in the patent system are of
a different and more pronounced nature then typical interest group dynamics and
the nature of boundary work within the patent system is unique amongst
disciplines. This exceptionalism traces its roots back to the earliest days of the
Industrial Revolution. As historical sociologist Dirk Van Zyl Smit has pointed
out, patent office practice itself has historically been unique amongst professions.
Many professions are born and develop as agents of certain dominant classes,
developing their own professional identity and interests through this
representational symbiosis. However, the early English patent agents of the
Industrial Revolution era created and deployed their own “ideological resources,”
authoring their own patent discourse “through their conceptive work in the legal
sphere.” 1 As they authored “sophisticated ideological justifications” for the patent
system, they also authored the discourse of their own professional identity
alongside developing the institutions of the patent system itself. Thus the
disconnect between the public and the patent system is in many ways inherent in
the origins of our modern patent institutions.
According to Parthasarathy, the ideological aim of patent institutions has thus
become the narrow goal of certifying inventions (p. 78), and to many of the
insiders, procedural objectivity, efficiency, and inventors’ interests are sufficient
to guarantee satisfaction of the public’s interest (pp. 17, 61). Any alternative
understandings of the roles and responsibilities of our patent institutions,
regardless of how modest, are swiftly rejected by patent insiders (p. 35). This
disconnect between the patent system and the public has created dual patent
insider/outsider narratives which have drastically diverged over time, generating
social myths that may not accurately reflect the realities of the patent system.
This disconnect between public perception of what the patent system is and what
actually happens in reality may be far more stark and pronounced than most, if
not all, other areas of law. 2 Given the many social perceptions that have, over
time, developed regarding what the patent system is and should be, we should be
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apprehensive about wholeheartedly accepting that a more democratic patent
system is necessarily a better patent system.
As an excellent example of these potentially confused social myths, one can look
to those who spoke on behalf of the independent inventors’ community during
passage of the AIA and their fight against transitioning to a “first-to-file” system.
Their argument was that a first-to-file system would prejudice independent
inventors and small-to-medium enterprises who would see their hard, inventive
work stolen by well-resourced, foreign multi-nationals who are better equipped to
play the “first-to-file” game. This assertion of independent inventors being
robbed by large corporations is tenuous at best, 3 and likely based on longstanding social myths surrounding the plight of “heroic inventors”. 4
Accordingly, democratizing the patent system may not necessarily lead to a better
patent system if the system only becomes a reflection of these pervasive social
myths. Furthermore, democratizing the patent system should not be taken to
mean that the practitioners and experts who have worked in this system for many
years do not possess valuable insights regarding best practices which the public
may lack.
Parthasarathy is careful to avoid jumping to such normative conclusions. Here
she points to the EPO’s nuanced approach to the democratization of the patent
system in the face of growing public interest concerns. The EPO has recognized
that “whether or not the patenting system is at fault… is immaterial. Blame is laid
at the door of the IP system by many forces in society” (p. 184). As
Partharsarathy puts it, “it [doesn’t matter] whether or not the patent system had
these distributional effects. The public believed it did, and therefore the patent
system and the EPO believed it and had to act accordingly” (p. 184). Recognizing
this disconnect, the EPO has taken steps - some more successful than others - to
slowly develop institutional initiatives directed to facilitating greater public
interest participation within the patent system dialogue (p. 196).
The foregoing highlights the key issues at play in this scenario. How has this
expertise barrier become so pronounced, preventing effective dialogue between
those insiders within the system and those outside of it? How and why have such
inaccurate understandings, on both sides of the insider/outsider divide, developed
regarding the functioning of the patent system along with its socioeconomic
effects? How do we build new systems to support effective communication
across this barrier? Regardless of who is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in any of these public
interest debates, this lack of dialogue across the patent expertise barrier threatens
the public legitimacy of the patent system. 5
Parthasarathy provides some conclusions on how to promote dialogue across the
expertise barrier between the inventive community and the patent experts, such as
developing new innovation governance frameworks incorporating broader
representation (p. 197) and robust patent office public interest participation
mechanisms (p. 196). However, Parthasarathy acknowledges that her work in this
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regard is not yet complete (p. 197). The hope is that this book will spark a much
needed conversation on how to begin chipping away at the wall that separates the
patent system and the public, and Parthasarathy has put forth an impressive effort
at getting the ball rolling through her brilliant case study on the fight for
democratic legitimacy within the context of patenting in the life sciences.
PATENT POLITICS is a brilliant account of how the patent system's “expertise
barrier” has created an institutional rift between the patent system and the public
it is meant to serve. Viewed in this light, Parthasarathy’s book is truly a unique
contribution to patent scholarship. Patent scholars continue to rehash age old
debates within standard philosophical frameworks while continuing to overlook
the sociology of patenting. 6 While patent scholarship’s regulatory turn hit full
stride several years ago 7, perhaps what patent law scholarship needs now is a
sociological turn. PATENT POLITICS may go a long way to ushering in this
much-needed new sociological patent law perspective.
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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC
WORLD by Jennifer E. Rothman. Harvard University Press, 2018. 256 pp.,
Hardcover, $39.95.
Reviewed by Eric E. Johnson
University of Oklahoma College of Law
eric.e.johnson@ou.edu
The right of publicity is the unruly adolescent of the intellectual property world.
Or is it the tort world? (Um, why is it any of your business?! You wouldn’t even
understand!!) The right of publicity is moody and unpredictable, headstrong and
heedless. Between you and me—and I hate to say this—it’s still figuring out how
to move its newly lengthened limbs without breaking things. (Not too long ago it
knocked over a stack of comic books 1 and almost destroyed a whole collection of
DVDs. 2) Like other teenagers, the right of publicity talks too loudly, thinks
everything it says is interesting, and—as you’ll know if you’ve read recent
cases—spends far too much of its time on video games. 3 (Remember when it was
obsessed with baseball cards? 4 It felt like those days would go on forever … ).
What will the right of publicity do to become a productive member of society?
Will it economically incentivize creative activity? Will it protect individual
autonomy? Whatever you do, don’t ask the right of publicity. It will just scowl at
you. The right of publicity is still figuring out what it wants to do for a job. If it
even wants a job.
Most of all, the right of publicity won’t take advice. But it should. It really should.
All we can do is keep talking and hope that something gets through.
Well, the right of publicity couldn’t ask for a much better guardian than Jennifer
E. Rothman, whose new book is THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY. Rothman, a
professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, has genuine love and affection
for the right of publicity, but she’s clearheaded about the need for discipline.
She’s also knowledgeable. Rothman has taught herself everything there is to
know about the right of publicity’s upbringing, including every embarrassing
story from the right of publicity’s childhood. If you want to hear those stories, put
the right of publicity in the spare room with the latest Grand Theft Auto, 5 close
the door, and open Rothman’s book. She’ll tell you how it all started and where it
all went wrong.
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The right of publicity lost its way, Rothman tells us, when it started to wander
from its roots in the right of privacy. Actually, check that. The right of privacy,
back in the beginning, was the right of publicity. “[A]t the origin of the right to
privacy,” Rothman explains, “privacy was primarily about the right to control
‘publicity’—when and how one’s image and name could be used by others in
public” (p. 11). This is a key contention for Rothman, and she backs it up with a
thorough and entertaining history.
Rothman begins deep in the culture and technology of the late 1800s, showing us
how the common-law right of privacy was a legal response to photographers and
print shops gaining the technical means to do as they would like with other
people’s faces. Rothman then follows the law through the first half of the 1900s:
In these decades, the right of privacy/publicity succeeded in allowing celebrities
and noncelebrities alike to keep control over their names and likenesses. They
could get damages for emotional distress, economic harms, and reputational
injuries. Persons’ agency over themselves was upheld with an increasingly cogent
and well-accepted common law right. The right of privacy was in a good place. It
was working.
But in this era were the first stirrings of trouble. Some rogue courts and loose
dicta suggested—against the weight of authority, Rothman tells us—that the right
to privacy wouldn’t protect celebrities (p. 44). Why? The right to privacy was,
these bad influences said, about compensating the hurt feelings of private people
who wanted to stay private, while celebrities, by their very nature, had shown they
didn’t want to stay private. This line of thinking raised the specter that celebrities
needed something different from the law prevailing at the time. Even though,
Rothman insists, they didn’t.
But the right of publicity didn’t start to go off the rails until mid-century, when
the Second Circuit handed down the granddaddy of all right-of-publicity cases,
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum. 6 The dispute involved one baseball
card company suing another over alleged exclusive rights to various players, and
the Second Circuit opinion that resulted from the case became the stuff of legend.
In the years since, Haelan Labs has become widely known to be the instant of the
birth of the right of publicity and the moment of the coining of the term “right of
publicity.” Widely known, yes—but wildly wrong. Rothman demonstrates that
the case originated neither of these things (p. 45). In fact, according to the
litigants, the litigation was not about the right of privacy, the right of publicity, or
anything of that ilk. Instead, it was about tortious interference with contract (p.
51). So how did it end up as the most influential right-of-publicity case of all
time?
To chart that metamorphosis, Rothman does meticulous research. She dives into
archives, bringing us, for instance, pictures of packaging used as litigation
exhibits and the trial testimony of New York Giants catcher—and face for both
Topps and Bowman—Wes Westrum (pp. 52 & 54). We get the snide
characterization by the Topps attorney of ballplayers being “child-like” in their
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propensity to sign away rights without legal representation or even bothering to
read what’s on the page (p. 54). In fact, the blizzard of haphazardly signed papers
isn’t just color, it’s a plot point. Rothman surmises that the seed for a right-ofpublicity solution to the case was sown when the district court judge faced the
prospect of having to read hundreds of contracts to untangle competing claims of
priority (pp. 57-58). The juiciest part, however, is where Rothman gets a hold of
the internal memoranda among the judges on the Second Circuit panel (pp. 6061). Here we get startling new insight into why the panel gravitated toward a
right-of-publicity basis for upholding claims of exclusive rights.
Judge Charles Edward Clark, Rothman suggests, was encouraged to look at things
from a right-of-publicity angle because of a book review he had recently read in
the Yale Law Journal. The review, written by Herman Finkelstein, an attorney for
music-publisher rights society ASCAP, concerned Samuel Spring’s Risks and
Rights in Publishing, Television, Radio, Motion Pictures, Advertising, and the
Theater. Judge Clark was apparently convinced on the basis of just the review’s
criticism of the book—since Clark admitted in his memo to Judge Jerome Frank
that he hadn’t read the book itself—that New York’s privacy statute would not
permit a claim for unauthorized use of celebrity images, only for unauthorized
uses of images of people who wanted to stay out of the public eye.
Of course, more than a half century later, Rothman has done the reading Judge
Clark didn’t have time for. She tells us Spring’s book got it right, and
Finkelstein’s book review got it wrong: New York cases had already held that the
state’s privacy statute protected celebrities against unauthorized exploitation of
their images (p. 61). Thus, Haelan Labs didn’t need to forge a new path.
Let us pause here to consider a collateral lesson that comes out of Rothman’s
research: A hasty book review can do enormous damage to the law. Gulp! (I now
feel obligated to encourage future judges to avoid relying on my review of
Rothman’s work and instead to go ahead and read her book. And I hereby
disclaim all damage done to the spacetime continuum by judges who don’t).
The marvelous way in which Rothman finds connections makes the reader think
she must have a large corkboard in her basement—like the ones you see on TV—
pinned with pictures and scraps of paper linked by strings of yarn. As one
example: Rothman even figures out why Judge Clark must have seen
Finkelstein’s book review—because it followed Clark’s own book review of a
procedure casebook in the same issue of the Yale Law Journal!
Problematic though Haelan Labs was, Rothman contends that the case did not,
itself, represent the transmogrification from the well-functioning right of
privacy/publicity we had before into the troublesome doctrine we have today.
Instead, it was a host of others who “took this ball from Haelan and ran with it”
(p. 64). Thus Rothman proceeds to the second part of her story, where the right of
publicity bloats and grows out of control.
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One group Rothman pins blame on is law students, for writing impulsive, poorly
researched comments in law reviews that she finds to have had surprising
influence (pp. 47-50, 68). What cannot be surprising, of course, is that so many
students wrote law-review notes about the right of publicity. It turns out the law
students of yesteryear flocked to sports- and entertainment-related cases for note
topics just as they do today. (Not that us IP scholars can be too judgy. One thing I
found looking over the photographs in the book is that Rothman and I have
collected the exact same Wes Westrum baseball cards. Um, you know, for
science).
Another influencer and target of Rothman’s criticism is Melville Nimmer, best
known as the original Nimmer of Nimmer on Copyright. Before his treatisewriting days. Melville Nimmer gained early prominence with his extremely
influential 1954 article, “The Right of Publicity.” 7 Rothman questions Nimmer’s
motivations for writing that piece, which she says took positions that benefitted
his then-employer Paramount Pictures and oversold the idea of a revolutionary
change in the common law in a way that would help him land a law professor job
(pp. 68-71). It’s a critique that is wince-inducing, but productive. Legal scholars,
as a profession, should probably be talking much more about how real-world,
beyond-the-fourth-wall influences end up shaping scholarship and, ultimately,
affecting the path of the law.
Rothman’s treatment of that other most famous right-of-publicity case, Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 8 (pp. 139-143), is another engrossing part of the
book. This is the case in which circus performer Hugo Zacchini sued a local
television station for airing footage of his human cannonball act performed at a
county fair. To scrutinize this case, Rothman does more first-rate historical
digging. She not only reads the clerks’ memos, she even inspects the underlining
on Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.’s copies. For those scholars, like me, who’ve
puzzled for years over why the Court granted certiorari in the case, Rothman
gives us new insight: The underlining of the phrases “fun-to-work-on” and “a lot
of fun” provides, when you think about it, a depressingly plausible explanation.
All of Rothman’s toiling in the archives and connecting of disparate threads helps
deliver her convincing story of how the right of publicity shifted away from its
original, beneficial right-of-privacy paradigm and toward its noxious, current
form as a transferrable, intellectual-property-type right. Morphed as it has been,
the right of publicity is no longer principally concerned with protecting people’s
dignity and their ability to control how they are presented to the world. Instead, as
Rothman’s book tells it, the right of publicity has become a tool to undermine
those interests, allowing corporate actors—such as managers, record labels, social
media platforms, and others—to grab people’s names and likenesses and use them
for corporate interests, dignity be damned.
The Haelan Labs case, the student law-review notes, Melville’s article, and the
Zacchini case all played a role, in addition to other influences that Rothman
catalogs. But what were the underlying motivations behind the big change? What
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motivated the characters in this drama? In part, it was a power grab by corporate
interests that stood to benefit from being able to separate people from the legal
rights to their own names and images. That’s unfortunate, of course, although it is
hardly an unusual storyline. Much more troubling is the extent to which,
according to Rothman’s account, the law was unwittingly redirected by the selfindulgence and intellectual laziness of judges and commentators who reached out
for something glittery to work on—but then didn’t do the research or hard
thinking needed to do a good job with it. That heartbreaking realization—made
possible by Rothman’s indefatigable historical work—is one of the book’s
signature contributions.
The highest achievement of Rothman’s work, however, is that it gives us a
thoroughly documented, unified picture of the right of publicity, allowing us to
see great cohesiveness in it. Early on in her book Rothman confesses, “The right
of publicity … rather than a single, uniform right, is in reality many different
laws. This variability makes these laws difficult to navigate and even to talk about
in a coherent fashion” (p. 3). Too true. I recently made my own attempt to provide
coherence to the right of publicity. 9 I’ll break the fourth wall to tell you that
writing that article frequently made me want to pull out my hair. Right-ofpublicity cases show a chronic disregard for procedural and doctrinal structure,
and they are filled with inconsistently used terms and bits of glossy nonsense that
patch over omitted analytical steps. Trying to unsnarl them can be maddening.
Thus, my experience intensifies my admiration for what Rothman has been able
to pull off in her book, putting the history, the rhetoric, the holdings, and the
personalities into a single, coherent narrative that tells a convincing story of how
the right of publicity went wrong, where it’s at now, and how we should start
fixing it.
If there is one weak point in the substance of Rothman’s book, in my view, it is
the chapter on copyright preemption. Like the rest of the book, this part is clearly
written and extremely well-researched. And I agree with Rothman’s sense that
copyright-preemption doctrine is troubled in the right-of-publicity context. But
her suggestions for righting the various problems in this area strike me as
unconvincing. Unexpectedly, Rothman does not leverage her privacy-centered
view of the right of publicity as a means for solving its copyright preemption
woes. 10 On the basis of the preceding chapters, however, she has convinced me
that doing so is fully plausible. I would be very glad to see Rothman marrying her
privacy-centered view with copyright-preemption analysis in a future work.
Another place for constructive criticism is the book’s cover. I realize it’s probably
eccentric to bring jacket design into an academic book review, but I think there’s
an interesting point to be made here. Designed by Jill Breitbarth, the cover seems
thematically disconnected from the book’s substance. It features the book’s title
and the author’s name arranged in blue semi-transparent bands across a blackand-white photo of a city’s pedestrian mall on a sunny day, shot from above—
perhaps from an unseen building or by a drone. Silhouetted people mill about with
their shadows on the bright surface. Two of the people in the plaza are
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windowboxed within one of the blue bands. We get the idea they are being spied
upon. The graphic elements in combination with the book’s subtitle, Privacy
Reimagined for a Public World, delivers the message that this book is about how
we are all surreptitiously watched as we go about our daily lives: tracked by
Fitbits, surveilled by the Five Eyes, and all that. Yet Rothman’s book isn’t about
any of that.
What would have been a fitting jacket design? I’ve come up with a few good
ones, myself. But I’ll spare you. You didn’t pick up this review to hear a law
professor pitch graphic design ideas. I’ll just tell you that the ideas I have all
involve recognizable faces—which, after all, is what the right of publicity is all
about.
I don’t know how the book’s cover was made, but in an experiment I found that
when I searched stock-photography website iStock using only the words “public”
and “plaza,” the first page of results included photos of the same city scene from
the same photographer. (It’s the Zeil in Frankfurt, credited to a photographer
named Meinzahn.) When you get to the particular photo used on the cover, you
find a little gem that, as it turns out, is very much connected to Rothman’s book
and the legal problems she is tackling. Along with the offer to license the photo is
this selling point: “Every file licensed comes with a $10,000 legal guarantee –
that’s our promise that when you use our content within the terms of our license
agreement, it won’t infringe on any copyright, moral right, trademark or other
intellectual property right or violate any right of privacy or publicity. You can
also purchase an Extended Legal Guarantee to increase that coverage to
$250,000.”
And so it is that an out-of-control right of publicity, with the unpredictable
capacity to sidestep the First Amendment, seems to have tied the hands of one
who might venture to put a more fitting cover on the book that decries it.
So don’t judge this book by its cover. (Unless you are willing to engage with the
cover in a well-researched meta-analysis that reveals its deeper meanings.) But do
read it.
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC
WORLD is an unquestionably important book. Masterfully researched and deftly
crafted, it is probably the best single source for gaining a deep understanding of
the doctrine’s history, context, and politics. I also am not aware of a more
effective introduction to the principal cases and current controversies. The
ultimate importance of the book comes more than anything from its careful,
nuanced, and well-ordered thinking about an area of law that has stayed defiantly
abstruse. The cogency of Rothman’s argument will win many converts, but the
clarity of her analysis will help even those who disagree with her. It deserves a
place among the must-reads of American right of publicity law.
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END NOTES
1

See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (upholding a right-ofpublicity claim by a hockey player nicknamed “Tony Twist” against the creator of
a villainous character nicknamed “Tony Twist” in the Spawn comic-book series).
2
See Dryer v. National Football League, 814 F. 3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016) (denying
right-of-publicity claim by former NFL players against the NFL for selling
documentary films using old game footage in which the players appear).
3
See, e.g., Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th
Cir. 2013); No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011).
4
See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959
(10th Cir. 1996).
5
See Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 111 (2018) (rightof-publicity claim by actress Lindsay Lohan for alleged portrayal in video game
Grand Theft Auto V).
6
202 F.2d 866.
7
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203
(1954).
8
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
9
Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 891
(2017).
10
Rothman does mention in the epilogue, in passing, that reuniting the right of
publicity conceptually with the right of privacy will help to limit clashes between
the right of publicity and copyright, but she does not develop this idea.
Suggested Citation: 9 The IP Law Book Review 6 (2019)
©2019 Eric E. Johnson

The IP Law Book Review

12

Vol. 9 No. 1 (February 2019) pp. 13-16
EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, by Shubha Ghosh
and Irene Calboli. Cambridge University Press, 2018. 218 pp., Hardcover,
$120.00.
Reviewed by Samuel F. Ernst
Golden Gate University School of Law
sernst@ggu.edu
The exhaustion doctrine refers to a principle that once an intellectual property
owner sells or authorizes the sale of a protected product, the IP rights in that
product are “exhausted.” The IP owner may not thereafter chase the article down
the stream of commerce and use IP law to collect additional royalties or place
further restrictions on the use or resale of the product. This simplified articulation
of the doctrine fails to account for all of the variations on exhaustion rules in
different countries and for different types of intellectual property; and fails to
capture the myriad ways in which IP exhaustion intersects with complicated
policy calculations, legal and economic theory, international trade, and areas of
law beyond IP, such as contracts, antitrust, and the regulation of pharmaceuticals
(to name a few). It takes a book to plumb the depths of exhaustion in all of its
variations and implications, and that book is Shubha Ghosh and Irene Calboli’s
new treatment, EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. The
book is a comprehensive guide to exhaustion, detailing the exhaustion regimes of
many countries around the world across the various forms of intellectual property
protection and against the backdrop of a clear and succinct explanation of the
policy and legal theory behind IP exhaustion. To borrow the pun most readily at
hand, this book exhausts the topic of IP exhaustion on many different levels.
First and foremost, the book is aggressively comparative in its scope. There has
been a flurry of legal scholarship attending several major decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court in recent years that revitalized copyright and patent exhaustion in
this country. 1 By this author’s count, there are approximately 450 law review
articles discussing just one of those decisions, Quanta Computer v. LG
Electronics. Professors Ghosh and Calboli’s book reminds the myopic U.S.
scholar that all of this sound and fury is just about one small corner of the
exhaustion world – U.S. patent law. The book does this through an exhaustive
(apologies) survey of the IP exhaustion regimes of the European Union, the
United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, and
member countries of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
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Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam).
Granted, the book does not discuss the exhaustion law of every country on earth
(the authors offer express regrets that “there is no discussion of Switzerland,
except in a short footnote in Chapter 5” (p. 2)). To correct this injustice, I will
state here that Switzerland observes regional exhaustion of patent rights (except
with respect to pharmaceuticals), but international exhaustion of trademarks and
copyrights (except with respect to performance rights) (p. 103, n. 48)). But the
authors assure us that “future editions may expand the set of representative
jurisdictions” (p. 2). And the existing survey is more than sufficient to provide
the reader with a framework for understanding the possible contours of the
exhaustion doctrine in different jurisdictions.
Of primary importance in the comparative discussion are the different rules
various countries observe with respect to whether foreign sales trigger exhaustion
and with respect to the ability to write contracts that evade exhaustion. On the
first issue, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the
TRIPS Agreement) allows signatory nations to determine for themselves whether
exhaustion of IP rights is triggered by a foreign sale, or only by a domestic sale.
This has led to a fascinating laboratory of exhaustion regimes in which some
countries observe national exhaustion (only a domestic sale triggers exhaustion),
some countries observe international exhaustion (foreign and domestic sales
trigger exhaustion), and some countries observe regional exhaustion (for example,
the European Union Countries, in which the sale of a patented product anywhere
in the European Union exhausts patent rights in the European Union, but not
elsewhere).
On the issue of writing contracts to evade exhaustion, the authors offer the
important insight that civil law countries tend to view the exhaustion of IP rights
as arising from an implied license a purchaser has to use and resell the purchased
item; these countries are more likely to allow for contracting around exhaustion
because the implied license can be expressly revoked. On the other hand,
common law countries tend to view exhaustion as arising out of the common law
policy against restraints on alienability of personal property; these regimes are
less likely to enforce contracts that purport to evade exhaustion because such
behavior would violate this policy against servitudes.
A second way in which this book is exhaustive is that it surveys exhaustion across
all of the relevant IP regimes. There are separate chapters devoted to trademark
exhaustion, patent exhaustion, and copyright exhaustion. Exhaustion in each of
these areas implicates different policy considerations. Moreover, exhaustion of
these different types of IP rights interplays and often conflicts with other IP
doctrines and areas of law, such as trade secret law and moral rights (aka “droit de
suite”), topics that are explored in detail. The situation becomes even more
complicated when one considers products that are subject to overlapping IP
regimes. For example, a particular country may observe international exhaustion
of trademark rights, meaning that a product lawfully sold overseas may be
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imported without running afoul of the trademark laws. But what happens when
the IP owner also claims copyright protection in the product labels in a situation
where, under the law of the country in question, those rights are not exhausted by
a sale overseas? A product that should be in the public domain under the policy
of the country’s trademark law nonetheless carries servitudes and restrictions
under the copyright law. An entire chapter is dedicated to these thorny problems
resulting from overlapping IP regimes.
A separate chapter is also devoted to the topic of digital technology and
exhaustion. Digital technology complicates the picture because technological
barriers can be imposed to prevent the reuse, copying, or resale of products even
after the IP rights are exhausted. Moreover, copyright exhaustion can be foiled in
situations where reuse violates reproduction rights as a technical matter. On the
other hand, digital technology facilitates the instant dissemination of various
products across borders in ways that can defeat IP rights.
And of course, as if comparative law were not enough, an entire chapter is
devoted to the ways in which exhaustion law interacts with international trade
law.
Finally, the book offers a rigorous discussion of the policy and legal theory
behind IP exhaustion. This discussion is remarkably clear in light of the
complexities involved, and the thesis appears to be that the complexities are
fundamentally important. For example, some scholars have argued that
international exhaustion benefits consumers in high-priced markets (by allowing
for competition from imports), but hurts consumers in low-priced markets (by
dissuading IP rights holders from engaging in useful price discrimination).
Professors Ghosh and Calboli refute this argument by drawing attention to the
many factors and variables this argument disregards. Whether and to what extent
the prices in the two countries tend to equalize depends on consumer demand in
the two countries, importation costs, regulatory costs, tourist and immigrant
consumption, and other factors. It could be that national exhaustion permits IP
holders to engage in predatory low pricing in the “low-priced” country in order to
eliminate competition in that country and raise prices thereafter. How is the
situation different for durable versus non-durable goods? What of companies that
use technology or product differentiation to achieve the effects of national
exhaustion in an international exhaustion regime? Maybe wealth maximization or
redistribution are not the only legitimate goals of an exhaustion regime.
Shouldn’t one also take into account the policies of free trade, competition, and
incentives to innovate? The book even offers speculation as to what John Locke,
Georg Hegel, and John Rawls would have had to say about IP exhaustion, if
anyone had bothered to ask.
In the end this book does not offer pat answers to the myriad policy questions
surrounding exhaustion except to point out that these questions are very
complicated. The authors tell us that the goal of the book is “to show the
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economic, political, social, and legal choices” that are available to countries in
formulating exhaustion doctrine (p. 207). The authors then undertake to explain
how the exhaustion regime a country chooses “has implications for international
trade, for secondhand markets, for consumer rights, and for distribution channels”
(p. 207). The book achieves these ambitious goals in spectacular fashion.
ENDNOTES
1

See Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017);
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519 (2013); Quanta Computer v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
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